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Abstract
In theory, the measurement of the social value creation of any investment project
requires estimating its consumption-based CAPM beta in order to compute its associated
risk-adjusted discount rate. In order to assist evaluators to perform this task, we link
this social beta to the underlying technical and economic environment of the project,
such as the price and income elasticities of the supply and demand for the flow of goods
and services generated by the investment. When the consumers’ willingness to pay and
the variable production cost are Cobb-Douglas in aggregate income and quantity, the
beta of the infrastructure has a flat term structure, and is positive for a normal good.
But when the infrastructure has a limited capacity, the term structure of the beta is
decreasing. Finally, as an illustration, we explain why an investment in a transfrontier
trading infrastructure line should have a negative beta for the country that most often
uses the line to export its cheaper good (such as electricity).
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1 Introduction
Although the ex ante evaluation of public policies has become a legal obligation in most
countries of the Western world, operational rules to perform them often remain fuzzy when
they exist. Moreover, these rules are usually second-best. The choice of the social discount
rate, which is a key parameter when most benefits are spread into the future, is particularly
controversial among economists. This was particularly apparent after the publication of the
Stern Review (Stern (2007)), as discussed for example by Nordhaus (2007), Weitzman (2007)
and Dasgupta (2008). The surveys performed by Weitzman (2001) and later on by Drupp
et al. (2015) showed little agreement among expert respondents about which rate should be
used to discount climate damages. This lack of consensus is also apparent in the attempt
by the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (2015) to estimate the Social
Cost of Carbon (SCC), since the report estimated it for different discount rates from 2.5%
to 5%, far from the U.S. official social discount rate of 7%. Unsurprisingly, this generates
estimations of the SCC that are far apart, from $11 to $56 per ton of CO2. This confirms
that "the choice of a discount rate over especially long periods of time raises highly contested
and exceedingly difficult questions of science, economics, philosophy, and law" (Greenstone
et al. (2013)).
It is also true that the theory has often been misleading. For example, the celebrated
Arrow-Lind theorem (Arrow and Lind (1970)) prevailed over decades among public institu-
tions on both sides of the Atlantic to support the use of a single discount rate to evaluate
all public investment projects. The idea was that the mutualization capability of the public
sector is so large that the risk of individual projects are washed out by diversification, so that
it should evaluate them assuming risk-neutrality. But many economists and most evaluation
experts overlooked the fact that Arrow and Lind implicitly assumed that the net benefit of
the public projects are statistically independent from each other, so that consumption per
capita is certain (Baumstark and Gollier (2014)). In reality, most investment projects, public
or private, have benefits that are statistically related to aggregate consumption. This implies
that diversification does not fully eliminate risk, and evaluators should be concerned with the
impact of public actions on the collective risk eventually borne by the risk-averse citizens.
The right reaction to the fallacious interpretation of the Arrow-Lind theorem was provided
by the development of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) by
Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979). In a Gaussian world, it justifies using
a discounting system that combines three ingredients: A "risk-free" discount rate for projects
whose net benefits are independent from aggregate consumption, a systematic risk premium,
and a CCAPM cash-flow beta (later on referred to as the "beta").1 The beta is specific to
the project, and, potentially, to the maturity of the benefit under scrutiny. It is defined as
the elasticity of the net social benefit of the project to a change in aggregate consumption.
A positive beta means that the project contributes positively to the macroeconomic risk and
1If there is no serial correlation in the per-period growth rate of aggregate consumption and if the rep-
resentative agent has constant relative risk aversion, then the risk-free discount rate and the systematic risk
premium have a flat term structure, i.e., they should be independent of the maturity under consideration
(Gollier (2002, 2016)). Countries like the United Kingdom and France currently use a non-flat term structure
for social discount rates, an approach that can be justified by the persistence of shocks to aggregate consump-
tion (Gollier and Weitzman (2010), Gollier (2012)). In fact, the three variables characterizing the efficient
discounting system can have a non-flat term structure.
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should be penalized accordingly by a larger risk-adjusted discount rate. On the contrary, a
negative beta signals a project that hedges the macroeconomic risk, and its insurance value
should be recognized by a reduced risk-adjusted discount rate. This project-specific risk-
adjusted discount rate should in fact be equal to the risk-free rate plus the product of the
project’s beta by the systematic risk premium. This means that the risk premium determines
the intensity of the penalization of a project due to its contribution to the macroeconomic
risk.
The literature has mostly been focused on the debate about which risk-free rate and
systematic risk premium should be used in this discounting system. This has been done in
the context of the risk-free rate puzzle (Weil (1989)) and the equity premium puzzle (Mehra
and Prescott (1985)) which state that the CCAPM predicts a risk-free rate that is too large
and a systematic risk premium that is too large compared to the asset prices that prevailed
during the last century of so. Many resolutions of these puzzles have been explored, in
particular by allowing extreme events (Barro (2006)) or by disentangling risk aversion from
the aversion to consumption fluctuations combined with adding long run risks in the modeling
of the stochastic growth (Bansal and Yaron (2004)). But very little has been made to help
evaluators in their quest of the project-specific betas.
Contrary to financial assets for which financial betas can easily be estimated by regressing
the asset return on the market return, it is often the case that no data is available to estimate
the risk profile of the net social benefit of specific public investment projects. Moreover,
using the classical arbitrage argument to value them is complex because of the lack of private
investments with a similar risk profile. This is partly due to the fact that the public sector
should integrate the social and environmental externalities into the net social benefit of each
project, something that is not systematically done in the private sector. One possibility is to
simulate a model by using the Monte-Carlo method, as done for example by Dietz et al. (2017)
to estimate the social beta of green investments aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse
gases. The difficulty is that the result heavily relies on the assumptions of the model and
on the calibration of the distribution for the uncertain parameters. All this implies that
estimating project-specific social betas remains a challenge.
The complexity of the estimation of social betas and the controversies associated to the
social discounting system have induced most governments to use a much simplified system
in which a single discount rate is used independent of the risk profile of the investment
projects. The second-best solution is then to use a single "risk-adjusted" discount rate which
is computed on the basis an average social beta in the economy. The United States have
adopted such an approach by selecting a discount rate of 7%, which is assumed to be the
average cost of capital in that country.2 This is a catastrophe, because it implies a vast under-
investment in the safest projects, and a vast over-investment in the riskiest ones. Moreover,
this single discount rate for the public sector should induce a transfer of risk from the private
sector.3 Other countries such as the United Kingdom and Norway took the even simpler
(and probably more inefficient) approach to estimate the social discount rate by using the
(extended) Ramsey rule, which is useful to compute the risk-free discount rate. Thus, in
the spirit of the fallacious interpretation of the Arrow-Lind theorem, these governments just
2See OMB (2003). A smaller discount rate of 3% could also be used for a sensitivity analysis.
3Notice however that many corporations also fail to adjust the discount rate for the risk profile of specific
investment projects. As shown by Krueger et al. (2015), they tend to use their weighted-average cost of capital
as their unique discount rate.
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ignore the risk aversion of their citizens. France is the only country that uses a CCAPM
discounting system in which evaluators must estimate the social beta of their project.4
This paper is a contribution to make the discounting methodology more user-friendly.
One clear identified point of resistance is the difficulty to estimate project-specific betas.
This is partly due to the absence of a literature in this domain. As far as we know, Breeden
(1980) is the only exception. Breeden derives asset-specific CCAPM betas from a system
of demand, and shows how to estimate them from the parameters of this demand system.
For the sake of pedagogy, we use a partial equilibrium approach by focusing on each specific
project and on its relation to aggregate consumption. We also aim at characterizing social
betas from the characteristics of the supply and demand for the flow of goods or services
that are generated by the public investment. From this work, the evaluators would be left
with the easier and more classical task of estimating these parameters, such as the price and
income elasticities of supply and demand.
2 The CCAPM discounting system
We consider an investment project which creates a market for a new non-durable product
or service. It could be a new drug, or an infrastructure in transportation, telecommunica-
tion, health, or education for example. We want to measure the socioeconomic value of the
flow of net benefits generated by this new market.5 Once this investment project has been
implemented and at any further date t, it costs g(x;Ct, θt) per capita to produce x units
of the product. This cost is a function of the income per capita Ct that prevails at date
t, and also of a set of other factors characterized by the vector θt, which is assumed to be
statistically independent of Ct. We assume that g is increasing and weakly convex in x. The
consumer’s value (or willingness to pay) per capita associated to consuming x at date t is
equal to f(x;Ct, νt). This consumer value is a function of the income per capita and of other
factors that are characterized at date t by νt, which is assumed to be statistically independent
of Ct. We assume that function f is increasing and weakly concave in x. All positive and
negative externalities generated in the production and consumption processes are integrated
into functions f and g.
We evaluate the investment project at date 0, which is the only date at which the project
can be implemented. This means that there is no option value to delay the investment in this
context. Seen from date 0, the future evolution of (Ct, νt, θt) is uncertain and is characterized
by an exogenous joint stochastic process which is arbitrary at this stage of the analysis. We
assume a flexible production technology, so that the optimal (or equilibrium) production and
consumption xt at any date conditional to (Ct, νt, θt) maximizes the net social benefit
Bt = B(Ct, νt, θt) = max
x
f(x;Ct, νt)− g(x;Ct, θt). (1)
4Norway was a precursor in this domain, but it reversed to a single discount rate in 2012 (Hagen et al.
(2012)). Ironically, France is now contemplating the possibility to also reverse to a single discount rate, using
the argument that France cannot be right alone.
5The global cost-benefit analysis of the project should also include the initial fixed cost of the project,
which is not included in our analysis. This fixed cost, the potential uncertainties associated to it, and the
measure of the cost of capital associated to its financing, raise important questions that are orthogonal to the
questions that we address in this paper and should be treated independently.
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Suppose that the project is scalable, and let s denote the scale of the project. Thus, the net
benefit at date t is sBt. We examine the impact of the implementation of this project on the
intertemporal welfare function
W (s) =
+∞∑
t=0
e−δtEu(Ct + sBt), (2)
where δ is the rate of pure preference for the present, u is the increasing and concave von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the representative agent, and E is the expectation
operator conditional to the information available at date 0. At that date, the value V (s) of
the flow of the net benefits generated by the project is such that the representative agent is
indifferent between implementing the project or receiving V (s) at date 0. This means that
u(C0 + V (s)) = W (s). As is standard in the asset pricing literature and in the cost-benefit
methodology, we assume that the project to be evaluated is marginal in the sense that its
implementation does not modify the beliefs associated to the dynamics of (Ct, νt, θt). This is
done by assuming that s tends to zero, and by measuring the social value P = V ′(0) of the
project. This means that
P =
+∞∑
t=0
e−rttEBt, (3)
where the risk-adjusted discount rate of the project for maturity t is defined as follows:
rt = δ − t−1 log
(
E [Btu′(Ct)]
u′(C0)EBt
)
. (4)
We normalize C0 to unity. In this paper, we use the standard calibration of the consumption-
based CAPM for economic growth and risk preferences. It is summarized in the following
assumption.
Assumption 1. The stochastic process governing aggregate consumption Ct is a geometric
Brownian motion with trend µ and volatility σ. Relative risk aversion is a constant γ.
This implies that the distribution of log consumption ct = log(Ct) is N(µt, σ2t) and that
u′(C) = C−γ . In this standard CCAPM framework, the pricing of a risk-free benefit and of
a claim on aggregate consumption is well-known under this assumption. The interest rate rf
is obtained by applying pricing equation (4) to Bt = 1, or more generally to any Bt that is
statistically independent of Ct:
rf = δ − t−1 log (E exp(−γct)) = δ + γµ− 0.5γ2σ2. (5)
The last equality is easy to obtain from the fact that when c ∼ N(µ, σ2), then E exp(kc) is
equal to exp(kµ + 0.5k2σ2).6 When the net benefit of the project is a claim on aggregate
consumption, i.e., when Bt = Ct, the risk-adjusted discount rate net of the interest rate
defines the systematic risk premium pi. From equations (4) and (5), we have that
pi = δ − t−1 log
(
E exp((1− γ)ct)
E exp(ct)
)
− rf = γσ2. (6)
6This is a classical formula in finance theory. For a survey of its use in the discounting literature, see
Gollier (2012).
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Notice that in this standard framework, the interest rate and the systematic risk premium
are independent of the maturity, i.e., their term structures are flat.
We are interested in examining the determinant of the risk-adjusted discount rate for
other investment projects. Based on the well-established tradition in finance, we define the
maturity-specific consumption beta βt of the investment project in such a way that the risk-
adjusted discount rate rt of the project for maturity t be equal to
rt = rf + βtpi. (7)
In other words, the project’s beta is defined as follows:
βt =
rt − rf
pi
, (8)
where rt, rf and pi are respectively defined by equations (4), (5) and (6). Given the interest
rate rf and the systematic risk premium pi, the project’s beta fully determines its discount
rate. We hereafter characterize the determinants of consumption betas in different economic
and technological environments. In the following proposition, we show that the beta of a
project at any specific date is linked to the OLS regression of log(Bt) over log(Ct).
Proposition 1. Suppose that there exists a pair (at, bt) ∈ R+ such that log(Bt) = at +
bt log(Ct) + εt, with E[exp(εt)|Ct] = 1 for all Ct. Then, under Assumption 1, the beta of the
investment project for maturity t is βt = bt.
Proof: Under the condition of this proposition, Bt equals Cbtt exp(at + εt). Because at is
certain and E[exp(εt)|Ct] is independent of Ct, equation (4) implies that
rt = δ − t−1 log
(
ECbt−γt
ECbtt
)
= δ − t−1 log
(
E exp((bt − γ)ct)
E exp(btct)
)
. (9)
Because ct is normally distributed with mean µt and variance σ2t, this implies that
rt = δ − t−1 log
(
exp
(
(bt − γ)µt+ 0.5(bt − γ)2σ2t
)
exp
(
btµt+ 0.5b2tσ2t
) ) . (10)
This simplifies to
rt = rf + btpi, (11)
where rf and pi are defined respectively by equation (5) and (6). Plugging this into equation
(8) yields βt = bt. 
This means that if the logarithm of the net benefit is the sum of a linear function of
log consumption plus a white noise, then the OLS estimator of the slope coefficient is the
consumption beta of the project. This is the case if B(Ct, νt, θt) is multiplicatively separable
into a function g(νt, θt) and a power function Cbtt of aggregate consumption. Observe that
this condition should be considered for each maturity in an independent manner from other
maturities. If it happens that the slope coefficient of the OLS regression is the same at all
maturities, then the term structure of the beta is constant. It makes sense in that case to
refer to "the" consumption beta of the project. But in general, the relationship between
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aggregate consumption and the net benefit of the project is not loglinear, in which case the
OLS regression yields a biased estimator of the true consumption beta.
In short, in the context described in Proposition 1, the CCAPM beta of a project is the
income-elasticity of the net benefit of the project. In the remainder of this paper, we are
interested in characterizing βt to the characteristics of the project that are given by functions
f and g. Before doing this, let us observe that a large social beta does not necessarily
translate into a smaller present value. Indeed, if the net benefit Bt is proportional to Cβt ,
the expected benefit EBt is proportional to exp(βµ+ 0.5β2σ2)t, which is increasing in β as
long as β is larger than −µ/σ2. Thus, a larger income-elasticity of the net benefit implies
a larger discount rate, but also a larger expected net benefit to be discounted, implying an
ambiguous global effect.
3 The benchmark case: Cobb-Douglas
In this section, we consider the following consumer value function:
f(x;C, ν) = νCρ x
1−α
1− α, (12)
where ν is positive, α belongs to [0, 1], and ρ belongs to R. This implies that f is indeed
positive, increasing and concave in x. It yields the following demand function:
xd(p;C, ν) = ν
1
αC
ρ
α p−
1
α . (13)
We can thus interpret ηdp = −1/α ≤ −1 as the price-elasticity of demand, whereas ηdc = ρ/α ≥
ρ is its income-elasticity. This implies that the income-elasticity ρ of the consumer willingness
to pay is equal to the opposite of the ratio of the income-elasticity and the price-elasticity of
demand.
We also assume that the variable cost function is as follows:
g(x;C, θ) = θCρ′ x
1+α′
1 + α′ , (14)
where θ is positive, α′ belongs to R+ and ρ′ belongs to R. It yields the following supply
function:
xs(p;C, θ) = θ−
1
α′C−
ρ′
α′ p
1
α′ . (15)
We can thus interpret ηsp = 1/α′ as the price-elasticity of supply, whereas ηsc = −ρ′/α′ is its
income-elasticity.
Solving program (1) for the optimal production and consumption of the non-durable
product yields
B(Ct, νt, θt) =
(α+ α′)ν
1+α′
α+α′
t θ
α−1
α+α′
t
(1− α)(1 + α′) C
β
t , (16)
with
β = ρ(1 + α
′) + ρ′(α− 1)
α+ α′ . (17)
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We conclude that Proposition 1 can be applied to this benchmark case when (θt, νt) are
jointly normally distributed. Namely, for this type of projects, the social beta has a flat term
structure and this beta is linked to the income and price elasticity of supply and demand, as
summarized in our next proposition, where equation (18) is a simple rewriting of equation
(17).
Proposition 2. Suppose that the consumers’ willingness to pay and the variable cost of
production of the service generated by the infrastructure are Cobb-Douglas. Then, under
Assumption 1, the beta of the investment in this infrastructure is maturity-independent and
equal to
β =
ηdc (1 + ηsp)− ηsc(1 + ηdp)
ηsp − ηdp
. (18)
In the special case in which costs are insensitive to the growth of aggregate consumption,
i.e., when ρ′ and ηsc are zero, we obtain the following result:
β = ηdc
1 + ηsp
ηsp − ηdp
. (19)
Notice that because ηdp is smaller than -1, the social beta for a normal good is increasing in
the price-elasticity of supply. The net benefit of the project is more sensitive to aggregate
income when the supply is more reactive to the increased demand generated by economic
growth. In particular, we have that
β =
{
ρ, if ηsp = 0,
ηdc ≥ ρ, if ηsp → +∞. (20)
When the price-elasticity of supply is zero, i.e., when the investment project generates a
constant flow of goods or services at a zero marginal cost, the beta of the project is the income-
elasticity of the consumer’s willingness to pay. This is intuitive, since the net social benefit
in this case coincides with the consumers’ valuation of the good produced. Alternatively,
when the price-elasticity of supply goes to infinity, i.e., when the marginal cost is constant,
then the beta of the project is just equal to the income-elasticity of demand. Observe that
in both cases, the beta of the investment project has the same sign as the income-elasticity
of the demand for the good or service that it generates. This suggests that the social beta
of public investment projects generating inferior (normal) goods be negative (positive). This
reinforces the idea that there should be a valuation bonus for projects that generates goods
that are most valuable for consumers in the worst-case scenarios. Some health and military
infrastructures satisfy this property.
Because 1+ηdp is negative, observe also from equation (18) that the social beta tends to be
reduced if the variable production cost is positively correlated with aggregate consumption
(ρ′ > 0 and ηsc < 0). This means that, everything else unchanged, one should favor invest-
ments that reduce the cost of producing goods particularly in the worst-case macroeconomic
scenarios.
To sum up our results in this section, economic theory provides a simple description of the
determinants of the social beta when the consumer’s willingness to pay and the producers’ cost
function are representable by Cobb-Douglas functions of quantities and aggregate income. In
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that case, the social beta can directly derived from the income-elasticities and price-elasticities
of the supply and demand for the flow of goods generated by the investment. When these
elasticities are constant through time, the social beta of the project has a flat term structure.
4 Limited capacity
In this section, we maintain the assumption of a multiplicative consumer surplus as in (12).
But we assume that the investment project is about creating an infrastructure with fixed max-
imum capacity K and a constant marginal cost below that capacity. This case corresponds
to the following total cost function:
g(x;C, θ) =
{
θx, if x ≤ K;
+∞, if x > K. (21)
Observe that although the marginal cost below the capacity is constant at each date, its level
can evolve stochastically through time. It yields the following net benefit:
B(Ct, νt, θt) =
 α1−αν
1
α
t θ
α−1
α
t C
ρ
α
t , if xd(θt;Ct, νt) ≤ K;
νtC
ρ
t
K1−α
1−α − θtK, if xd(θt;Ct, νt) > K,
(22)
where xd is the demand function defined by equation (13). Notice that contrary to the
previous case, the net benefit is not a power function of consumption, so that the CCAPM
beta is more complex to estimate. Consider for example the case of a normal good (ηdc > 0) in
a growing economy (µ > 0), so that the demand for the product or service generated by the
infrastructure is expected to increase through time. Suppose also that the trend of growth of
the marginal cost θt is small. We assume that the capacity of the infrastructure to be built
is large enough to guarantee almost surely that the capacity constraint will not be binding
in the short run. In that case, equation (22) implies that the logarithm of the net benefit is
a linear function of log income plus a white noise, with a slope coefficient ρ/α = ηdc . This
means that the beta of the project is equal to that income-elasticity of demand in the short
run.
Consider alternatively very long maturities for which the demand is so large that the
capacity constraint will almost surely be binding. In that case, equation (22) tells us that the
beta of the project tends asymptotically to ρ ≤ ηdc .7 For intermediate maturities, the project’s
beta goes down gradually from ηdc to ρ. The term structure of the beta of the investment
project is decreasing. It is due to the fact that at longer maturities, the supply is less likely
to be reactive to changes in the demand, a phenomenon that reduces the income-elasticity
of the net benefit as seen in the previous section. The exact formula to estimate the beta at
each time horizon combines equations (4), (5) and (6), using equation (22) for Bt.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the consumers’ willingness to pay for the service generated by
the infrastructure is Cobb-Douglas, and that the marginal cost of this service below the fixed
capacity K of the infrastructure is constant but uncertain. Suppose also that the demand at
7More precisely, the net benefit combines a gross benefit whose beta is ρ and a gross cost whose beta is
zero. It is only when θ = 0 that the project’s beta is ρ as soon as the capacity constraint is binding almost
surely.
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marginal cost pricing is expected to grow over time. Then, under Assumption 1, the beta of
the investment is decreasing, going from ηdc for maturities where the capacity constraint is
almost surely not binding, to ρ ≤ ηdc for maturities where the capacity constraint is almost
surely binding.
We illustrate these results by the following numerical example. Consider an investment
project to build an infrastructure with a capacity K = 4. We assume that the consumers’
willingness to pay equals f = 1.5Cx2/3. This implies a price-elasticity and an income-
elasticity of demand equaling respectively −3 and 3. As stated earlier, we assume a geometric
brownian motion for Ct, here with C0 = 1, a trend µ = 0.02 and a volatility σ = 0.04. We
also assume an independent geometric brownian motion for θt, with θ0 = 1, a trend µθ = 0
and a volatility σθ = 0.001. This implies in particular that the current demand for the service
of the infrastructure at current marginal cost equals 1.8 Finally, we assume that the rate of
pure preference for the present is δ = 0, and that relative risk aversion is γ = 2. In Figure
1, we have drawn the term structure of βt in that case. It is obtained for each increment of
5-year maturity by Monte-Carlo simulation using 200 000 random draws of the pair (Ct, θt).
20 40 60 80
t
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
βt
Figure 1: The term structure of the CCAPM cash-flow beta in the case of a capacity investment
K = 4. We assume that α = 1/3, ρ = 1, δ = 0, γ = 2, log(θt) ∼ N(0, 0.0012t) and log(Ct) ∼
N(0.02t, 0.042t). The plain curve corresponds to the correct beta when using equation (8), whereas
the dashed curve is obtained when approximating the beta as the regressor of log(Bt) over log(Ct).
Two remarks should be made at this stage. First, it can be very misleading to estimate
"the" discount rate of the project by estimating the statistical log-relationship between the
net benefit and aggregate income at short maturities. In our numerical example, benefits are
disseminated over distant maturities, for which the socially desirable discount rate is much
smaller than the short discount rate. Second, for intermediary maturities, the support of
the distribution of the demand xd(θt;Ct, νt) contains K. As seen from equation (22), the
8Notice that, at maturity t, the log excess capacity log(K/xd) is normally distributed with a mean of
log(4) − 0.02t and a variance of 0.0144t. This means in particular that the expected log excess capacity at
marginal cost pricing is zero in 69 years.
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logarithm of the net benefit Bt is not linear in the logarithm of aggregate income Ct. This
is seen in Figure 2 in which we depicted the outcome of 10 000 random draws of the pair
(C25, θ25) for a 25-year maturity, using the calibration as in the example of Figure 1. The
plain curve corresponds the efficient beta with B25 = kCβ2525 , with k = EB25/EC25, meaning
that the uncertain benefit B25 represented by this cloud has the same value than a benefit
which would have this deterministic relation with C25. Notice that this beta fails to recognize
the lower sensitivity of the net benefit to changes in aggregate consumption in the best states
of nature. This compensates the underestimation of this sensitivity in intermediary states.
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
C25 .
2
4
6
8
10
12
B25
Figure 2: Monte-Carlo simulation of (C25, B25) for a 25-year maturity in the numerical example
of capacity investment described in Figure 1. The plain curve describes the true beta, whereas the
dashed curve is the best log-OLS fit.
As observed in Proposition 1, the beta of a project is equal to the regressor of log(Bt)
over log(Ct) when these two random variables are jointly Normal. It is tempting to define
the beta of a project in this way. But this should not be considered because it does not
generate an efficient discounting system when using equation (11). This is illustrated by
the two figures of this section. In Figure 2, we have drawn the best fit of the log-OLS for
(C25, B25). This estimator is biased upwards. This is confirmed in Figure 1 in which we
have depicted the term structure of the cash-flow beta of the capacity investment when using
this econometric approach of the beta. The OLS beta tends to slightly overestimate the
efficient beta at intermediary maturities. It is only at very short or long maturities that the
econometric approach is unbiased. This is due to the fact that the probability of (not) being
capacity constrained at those maturities is almost zero, so that the pair (log(Ct), log(Bt)) is
almost joint Normal.
We now consider an investment that marginally increases the capacity K of the infras-
tructure. Using equation (22), we obtain that the net benefit in this case has the shape of a
call option:
B(Ct, νt, θt) =
{
0, if νtCρtK−α ≤ θt;
νtC
ρ
tK
−α − θt, if νtCρtK−α > θt,
(23)
Under assumption 1, the log of consumption at time t is a normal distribution with mean µt
and variance σ2t. If we additionnally suppose that νt = θt = 1, the expected benefit E[B(C)]
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can be rewritten as
K−αeρ
2σ2t/2+ρµtφ(α logK − ρµt− ρ
2σ2t
ρσ
√
t
)− φ(α logK − ρµt
ρσ
√
t
)
where φ(z) = (2pi)−1/2
∫+∞
z e
−u2/2du. When t→∞, we see that E[B(Ct)] ∼ K−αe(ρ2σ2/2+µρ)t
and, similarly, E[B(Ct)C−γt ] ∼ K−αe((ρ−γ)
2σ2/2+µ(ρ−γ))t, so that rt ∼ rf + ργσ2/2. This
shows that the beta of this incremental project tends asymptotically to ρ when the demand
for the infrastructure is expected to grow over time. Reversely, when K tends to ∞, since
E[B(Ct)C−γt ] < E[B(Ct)]K−γα/ρ, the risk-adjusted discount rate for a given maturity t tends
to ∞. This reflects the fact that the probability of benefiting from the marginal increase of
capacity tends to zero, and becomes very sensitive to economic growth. In other words, the
expected benefit tends to zero whereas the corresponding beta tends to infinity.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the consumers’ willingness to pay for the service generated by
the infrastructure is Cobb-Douglas with νt = 1, and that the marginal cost of this service
below the fixed capacity K of the infrastructure is equal to 1. Suppose also that the service
is a normal good (ρ ≥ 0). Under Assumption 1, the beta of a marginal increment in the
capacity infrastructure has the following properties:
• Assuming a positive trend of growth, its term structure tends to ρ asymptotically.
• It tends to infinity with K.
To illustrate this, let’s consider an investment in supplementary marginal capacities that
should be required to meet the next years growth of demand. For short maturities, the
net expected utility of the project is very low - since there is a very low probability that
these additional capacity will be used. The additional capacity is very large with respect
to the actual need, so that the beta of the project is very high at short horizon and tends,
according to the previous proposition, to ρ for large horizon. In the left part of Figure 3
thereafter, we have drawn this term structure with the same assumption as in figure 1, but
for a incremental investment from K = 4 to K = 4.1. Since the usage of such investment is
low when the beta is high, one may wonder whether this term structure has a strong impact
on the total expected value of the project. In the right figure thereafter, we compare the net
present value of yearly expected benefit when using either the exact term structure of the
beta, or its limit value β = ρ = 1. We see that it has indeed a very significant impact, since
it decreases the expect value by about 20% when the additional infrastructure induces the
highest discounted benefit.
5 Transfrontier trade infrastructure
We consider now an investment that creates an infrastructure to trade goods between two
countries. It could be a transport infrastructure such as a railway infrastructure, or a trans-
frontier electricity connection. This infrastructure is particularly useful to transfer a tradable
good from the country where the equilibrium price of this good is low to the other country
where it is larger. For the sake of illustration, let us consider a concrete example, where two
countries exchange electricity through a high-voltage electricity line. In that case, when a
12
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Figure 3: Term structure of the beta for of a capacity investment from K = 4 to 4.1 (right), and
its impact of net present values of benefit (left). This latter graph compares the expected discounted
benefits according to whether the exact term structure for the beta is used, or its limit value β = 1.
country has an instantaneous surplus of zero-marginal-cost energy, it may use the transfron-
tier electricity connection to export this energy to the other country. The occurrence of such
an event depends upon weather conditions, as well as upon local demand. As a result, an
exporting country that slips into recession will consume less electricity and might then be
able to exploit more the transfrontier connection to its own benefit.
We use the same notation as before by adding a subscript i = 1, 2 to represent the two
countries. In autarky, the welfare of country i is given by
Vi = max
xi
fi(xi, Ci)− gi(xi, θi). (24)
Let us consider a trade infrastructure of size K whose flow of net benefits is equally shared
by the two countries. The social surplus generated by the infrastructure is then defined as
follows:
S(K) = max
x1,x2,y1,y2
∑
i∈{1,2}
(fi(xi, Ci)− gi(yi, θi)) −
∑
i∈{1,2}
Vi
s.t. y1 + y2 = x1 + x2
|y1 − x1| ≤ K,
where xi and yi denote respectively the local consumption and local production that may
be exchanged. We are interested in measuring the social benefit of marginally increasing
the capacity of the transfrontier infrastructure. Let’s first assume that country 1 has a
comparative advantage in terms of production costs or that country 2’s demand is higher, so
that this infrastructure is used to transfer goods from country 1 to country 2, and p2 > p1
where pi is the equilibrium price in country i. We have xi = yi + (−1)iK and, by the
envelop theorem, the social surplus of increasing marginally K is equal to p2 − p1. It’s the
productivity gain generated by the investment, which marginally transfers the production of
the good from the high marginal cost country to the low marginal cost one. For simplicity,
we assume here that the sharing of the social surplus between the two countries is such that
country i receives share ki, with k1+k2 = 1. The general formula that gives the social benefit
of the project accruing to country i is then
Bi = ki |p2 − p1| . (25)
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Equation (25) states that the benefit of the extension of the infrastructure accruing to country
i just corresponds to its share of its global value creation.
We examine the beta of the marginal investment project from the point of view of the
exporting country 1. Suppose first that shocks to the two countries are idiosyncratic. As-
suming that the good is normal, a positive shock on country 1’s growth increases demand
in that country, and thus the price p1, whereas it has no impact on p2. Therefore, the net
benefit for the exporting country 1 is the difference between two flows, one with a zero beta,
and the other with a positive beta. This implies a negative beta for this exporting country.
The intuition of this result is simple: When the exporting country faces a positive shock to
its aggregate income, its equilibrium price goes up, thereby reducing the price gap between
the two countries, at least in expectation. This reduces the social value of the infrastructure.
Symmetrically, the beta of the infrastructure is positive for the importing country.
Proposition 5. Consider two countries in which the willingness to pay and the cost function
are described by equation (26), with ρi > 0. Suppose that the two countries face idiosyncratic
macroeconomic uncertainties, and that the infrastructure is almost surely used to expert from
one specific country to the other. Then, the beta of the social value of a transfrontier trading
infrastructure is negative for the exporting country, and positive for the importing one.
In most cases, the trade infrastructure can be used to transfer goods in both directions.
This is the case when the price gap alternates in sign across different states in nature. For
instance, in the case of a high-voltage electricity line, depending on weather events and time
of the year, a country may export energy some days, and import energy the rest of the time
through the cross-border infrastructure. The value at date t of the investment is equal to
Bt = Σ%t,θBt,θ = Σ%t,θ
∂St,θ
∂K
,
where St,θ is the social surplus of country 1 at date t when the weather state θ occurs. We
denote %t,θ for the probability of that state. We are interested to measure the income-elasticity
of this benefit Bt. To give the intuition, if the estimation with an OLS-regressor of the
logarithm was correct, the beta would be exactly the weighted average of the expected value of
the beta associated to each climatic event, that is β = Σ%′βt,θ where βt,θ = dLn(Bt,θ)/dLn(w),
for the modified weight %′t = %t,θBt,θ/Σ%i,θ′Bi,θ′ . This suggests that Proposition 5 can be
generalized when the direction of the flow of trades is uncertain. In that case, it is the
expected beta measured as explained above that determines the beta to be used for the
evaluation of the project. In practice, this method is biased because the distribution of the
log of social benefits is not normal, and because its relation with log consumption is not
linear.
In the following numerical example, we show that the same ideas continue to hold, in
which the country which is expected to predominantly use the line as an exporter should
use a negative beta to evaluate that trading infrastructure project. We assume that the
two countries have the same constant price elasticities of demand and supply, and that the
marginal cost is independent of income, so that the consumer surplus and the cost function
are given by
fi(xi, Ci) = Cρii
x1−αi
1− α gi(yi, θi) = θi
y1+α
′
i
1 + α′ , (26)
14
We suppose that the traded good is normal (ρi > 0). Suppose as in the other examples
of this paper that γ = 2 and δ = 0. Suppose also that ρ1 = ρ2 = α′ = 1, α = 1/3. We
assume further that (C1t, C2t, θ1t, θ2t) follows independent geometric brownian processes with
µC1 = µC2 = 0.02, σC1 = 0.04, σC2 = 0.01, µθ1 = µθ2 = 0 and σθ1 = σθ2 = 0.001. One key
element is that although the initial aggregate consumption levels C10 = C20 = 1 are the
same, country 1 has a smaller initial variable cost, as we assume that θ10 = 1 and θ20 = 2.
This implies that, initially, p10 = 1 and p20 = 2, so that country 1 is exporting to country 2.
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
C1,25 .
0.1
0.2
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0.4
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B1,25
Figure 4: Monte-Carlo simulation of (C1t, B1t) for a t = 25 years maturity for the initially exporting
country 1. The plain curve describes the true beta (β = −2.47) of that country for that maturity,
whereas the dashed curve is the best log-OLS fit (βOLS = −3.25). We assume µC1 = µC2 = 0.02,
σC1 = 0.04, σC2 = 0.01, µθ1 = µθ2 = 0, σθ1 = σθ2 = 0.001, C1,0 = C2,0 = 1, θ1,0 = 1, θ2,0 = 2. and
k1 = k2 = 0.5.
We see in Figure 4 that the statistical relationship between the aggregate consumption in
country 1 and the net benefit of the infrastructure for that country is well fit by a negative
exponential on the left of this figure, where economic growth in that country is low enough to
preserve its exporting advantage. This implies the negative beta for this country. However,
it fails to recognize that for larger growth rates of C1, the demand and the local price in
that country will grow faster, transforming the country into an importer. This explains
why the relationship between aggregate consumption in country 1 and its net benefit of the
infrastructure becomes positive. For longer maturities, the initial comparative advantage of
country 1 is more likely to disappear because of the uncertain growth in local demands and
costs. This tends to bring the beta of the infrastructure of country 1 closer to zero. This
is suggested in Figure 5, which describes the term structure of the cash-flow beta from the
point of view of country 1. It is obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations of 200 000 random
draws at each maturity.
We applied this methodology to a concrete example, the investment in an additional
cross-border electricity connection between France and Spain. This was done based on data
provided by the French electricity transmission system operator (RTE). Uncertainty on de-
mand and supply is captured by 14 climatic scenarios, giving for each hour of year 2030
consumers’ demand and available renewable energy. This takes also into account the avail-
able production capacity of different types of non-renewable energy (gas, hard coal, light oil,
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Figure 5: The term structure of the CCAPM cash-flow beta in the case of the small transfrontier
trade infrastructure from the point of view of the initially exporting country 1, assuming the same
parameters as in Figure 4. The plain curve corresponds to the correct beta when using equation (8),
whereas the dashed curve is obtained when approximating the beta as the regressor of log(B1t) over
log(C1t).
France Spain
Welfare analysis -1.17 0.42
Table 1: Beta of a marginal investment to increase the size of the cross-border link.
lignite and nuclear) in both countries. The analyzed scenario within the Ten-Year Network
Development Plan designed by the community of European Network of Transmission System
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), and is a conservative one with about 40% renewable
energy9. We estimate the beta of the benefit characterized by equation (25) for a project that
increases marginally the existing cross-border connection between France and Spain. Results
are presented in Table 1. As expected, the beta of the project is negative for the exporting
country (France), and positive for the importing one (Spain).
A refinement of this tool would be to take into account the impact of a marginal investment
in a cross-border link on the terms of trade. It can be quite significant in the previous example
because electricity is an homogeneous good that is sold in bulk at a price equal to its marginal
production cost. Consequently, a slight change in the cross-border transport infrastructure
can trigger a jump from a price equal to the zero marginal cost of renewable energy to
the non-zero marginal cost of fossil energy. It will induce a gain of trade for the exporting
country, and an equivalent loss for the importing country. An empirical evaluation using
RTE’s data shows that the impact can be positive or negative at very specific time horizons,
and close to zero elsewhere depending on the expected volume of energy produced in each
9This scenario corresponds more precisely to vision 1 of the Ten-Year Network Development Plan, released
in 2014 by ENTSO-E.
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countries.10 We do not consider that in our evaluation of electricity betas because it does not
affect global welfare, since it is a zero-sum transfer between countries, and also because this
effect is very transient, as we just explained, and very sensitive to assumptions with respect
to profit sharing.
A second refinement would be to take into account the correlation between macroeconomic
cycles, which is significantly positive between France and Spain - cf. for instance Agresti and
Mojon (2001) for an evaluation of this correlation. In that case, the social benefit 0.5|p2−p1|
is the sum of a negative-beta term and a positive-beta term, and betas are closer to zero
than in the idiosyncratic case estimated in the previous figure. Reversely, in the presence of
asymmetric shocks, a negative shock in the exporting country reduces the local price whereas
price would rise on the other side of the border if a positive shock were affecting at the same
time the importing country. This boosts the net benefit of the infrastructure even more than
when shocks are idiosyncratic.
All this matters a lot as far as an incomplete monetary union is concerned. Indeed, the
above example concerns the euro area, which remains quite distant from an optimal mone-
tary zone in the sense of Mundell. We know since Eichengreen (1992) that it is composed
of countries experiencing significant asymmetric shocks, which traditional adjustment mech-
anisms via labor mobility are not sufficient to mitigate.11 The preceding analysis shows that
an investment in a cross-border infrastructure can bring to each country a benefit strongly
negatively correlated to its economic activity, and thus play an attenuating role in the event
of an asymmetric shock. Other similar investments may have a strong positive beta, and the
tools presented here are a valuable way to distinguish and prioritize investments with this
factor in mind.
6 Conclusion
Discounting remains a crucial, controversial and complex ingredient of modern investment
theory. It traditionally serves two purposes by penalizing cash flow for being both delayed
and risky. These two dimensions are taken care of by two independent parameters, the risk-
free rate and the systematic risk premia, for which a large literature exists that elaborates
on their level and term structure. A full discounting system also requires a methodology
for determining the weight beta accrued to the risk component of the project-specific dis-
count rate. In the simplest case in which the net benefit of the investment project under
scrutiny and aggregate consumption are jointly log-normal, this "cash-flow" beta is just the
income-elasticity of the net benefit. We show in this paper that this situation prevails when
the investment project is to build an infrastructure that produces a good or service whose
consumers’ willingness to pay and variable production costs are Cobb-Douglas in income and
quantity. We showed how to derive the cash-flow beta of such an investment from the price
and income elasticities of supply and demand functions. We developed the idea that the
beta is increasing in the income-elasticity of demand. When the variable cost function is
insensitive to aggregate consumption, the beta is positive for a normal good, and negative for
10More precisely, the marginal cost curve of electricity can be described by a step function, so that the
impact on trade will be zero when the expected volume of electricity is located on the flat part of this curve.
11Whether the level of synchronization of business cycle has significantly increased or not since then is still
an open debate, cf. De Haan et al. (2008) for a survey of that empirical literature.
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an inferior good, as is intuitive. But this is a very special case. If for example, there exists a
limited capacity for the infrastructure to produce a normal good, we showed that the term
structure of the beta is decreasing.
We assumed in this paper take-it-or-leave-it-forever investment opportunities, thereby
leaving aside the problem of real option values. Because the future benefits of an investment
in a capacity infrastructure generally depend upon whether this capacity will be expanded
or not when the capacity constraint will become binding, the problem of estimating the
beta cannot be separated from the problem of estimating real option values. We leave this
important question for further research.
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